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Abstract
This paper explains the lack of democratization in resource exporting countries
using a two period resource extraction model. There are two classes of agents: elite
who own capital and natural resources and citizens who own labor. The elite announce,
in the ﬁrst period, their plans for resource extraction and investment in the economy.
Citizens, in the second period, decide whether to conduct a revolution against elite
to capture their share of rents from un-extracted resources. Government policies are
designed to ensure that the elite remain in power and that citizens do not have the
incentive to revolt. These policies subsidize extraction and investment during the ﬁrst
period. The extraction subsidy reduces the beneﬁt of revolution while the investment
subsidy increases its cost. On the other hand, policies in the democracy case are not
constrained by the revolution threat and represent the median voter preferences. The
resource is over extracted in the non-democratic case compared to the democratic case.
Also, investment in the non-resource sector is lower. The important ﬁnding of the model
is that extraction path goes against price signals; ﬁrst period extraction increases with
the increase of the resource price in the second period. Non-Democratic institution is
the rational choice of the elite even with the costly policies to prevent a revolution.
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1 Introduction
Among the top twenty ﬁve fuel exporting countries, only Norway is classiﬁed as a full democracy
according to the Economist Index of Democracy. Similarly, a handful of countries are considered
full democracies within the top countries exporting ores and minerals1(Table 1). This observation
is backed by several empirical studies that found a negative correlation between natural resources,
speciﬁcally oil, and democracy, suggesting that resources have a negative impact on democracy
[Frankel, 2010, Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004, Ross, 2001, Smith, 2004]. Alternatively, it could
be that oil is present in countries where democracy is absent. Most of these countries are located
in the Middle East where authoritarian regimes are the common denominator. The same applies
to major oil exporting countries in Africa such as Nigeria, Gabon and Sudan. Either way, the
question still remains why is it that resource dependent countries do not make the transition to
democracy whereas resource poor countries make the political transformation. To my knowledge,
there are no economic theoretical models that attempt to answer this question. This is mainly due
to the fact that, until recently, economists have not dealt with democratization with an economic
perspective.
The literature on democratization suggests that political transition could take place either
through a rise of an economic class that demands more political power or through a political
mass that has a credible threat of revolution. In the former case, the resource dependence crowds
out other important economic activity in other sectors that are deemed necessary for growth and
development such as investment in human and physical capital [Gylfason et al., 1999, Sachs and
Warner, 2001]. This crowding out eﬀect blocks the channel of modernization, as suggested by Lipset
[1959], as it hinders the growth of a class of agents that is powerful economically and politically.
As for the revolution channel, there is a new stream of economic literature that attempts to explain
political transition but does not deal with resource dependent economies. It is based on conﬂict
between two classes of agents: a rich minority that actually holds power and a poor majority
that demands political power. In a non-democracy setting, elite use their political power to set
redistributive policies to their beneﬁt. Obviously, poor agents would favor a more redistributive
scheme which they can only obtain in a democracy, where policies are, in principal, determined
through voting and reﬂect the median voter preferences. It is important to emphasize that if
decisions are solely economic and rational and there are no ideological preferences to a political
structure over the other, elite will have the incentive to keep the political structure as it is. They
might eventually consider extending the franchise if they are faced with a credible threat of
1In 2008, the Economist Index of Democracy ranked 51 countries as authoritarian, 36 countries as hybrid
regimes, 50 countries as ﬂawed democracies and 30 as full democracies. Another index of political freedom is
the Freedom House index which is less structured than the Economist Index of Democracy. The 2010 Freedom
House Index classiﬁed 47 countries as not-free, 58 countries as partially free and 89 countries as free. Some
resource exporting countries such as Chile and Bulgaria are considered ﬂawed democracies while others such as
Georgia and Armenia are considered hybrid regimes.
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revolution. Such a move from citizens has potentially unfavorable consequences for the elite as
they would lose more than they would have given away in the case of a democracy. The process
of political transition, or democratization, is initiated when the cost of extending the franchise for
elite and the cost of revolution for citizens are both low. Income inequality plays an important
role in this process. The higher inequality the more redistribution of income will hurt the elite and
beneﬁt the poor in a non-democracy [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 2001]. One can argue that
democratization in Europe during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century has followed
this pattern. This literature opens the ﬁeld for further analysis on the special case of countries
where resource revenues are substantial and are concentrated within a small group of agents or
collected by the government2. The other interesting characteristic and is particular to resource
dependent economies is the non-renewable supply of the resource.
This paper is an extension of the literature on democratization. It also uses the insights on
the importance of rent seeking behavior in resource dependent economies. When rents generated
by resource exports are collected by a group in power, they increase the value of staying in power
and increase the cost of giving it away [Caselli and Cunningham, 2009, Robinson et al., 2006].
When faced by a challenger, the rational response by incumbent governments is to adopt policies
such as patronage and unproductive investment that would increase the probability of retaining
power. These create ineﬃciencies in the resource and non-resource sectors. There are a couple
of missing elements in the existing political economy models of resource management. The ﬁrst
is that they do not address the possibility of a threat of revolution by the rest of the population
in the economy. The only threat they consider is a threat of a challenging politician with a
competing set of policies. The challenging politician does not necessarily represent the median
voter preferences. If the transition does in fact take place, it is from on dictator to the other.
The other missing element is that the policies oﬀered by the challengers cannot be aﬀected by
the incumbent government. I address these missing elements in this paper. I model a threat of
revolution conducted by citizens where the main beneﬁt is to capture a representative part of the
resource rents. This threat is a way to model diﬀerent kinds of collective action. It could be a
full ﬂedged revolution or it could be a social unrest that would aﬀect elite negatively. Taking the
threat into consideration, the elite adopt policies that aﬀect the whole economy and ensure that
the revolution does not take place.
I also make the argument that the type of political institution determines whether a resource
endowment is a blessing or a curse. Decentralized models that explore the institutional nature
of the resource curse seem to dismiss this type of institution3. Institutional quality is modeled
2Oil extraction within the members of OPEC is either controlled by government directly or indirectly through
government controlled ﬁrms.
3Empirical literature on the resource curse found robust negative correlation between resource dependence and
economic growth Brunnschweiler and Bulte [2008], Sachs and Warner [1995, 1999, 2001]. For a comprehensive
overview see Hodler [2006] and Sachs and Warner [2001].
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as an exogenous parameter as in Mehlum et al. [2006], or as the initial number of productive
entrepreneurs as in Baland and Francois [2000], or as the number of fractions or political groups
within the economy as in Lane and Tornell [1996], Tornell and Lane [1999], Hodler [2006]. None
of these models considers political institutions as a determining factor, as this paper argues. The
linkage between economic choices of agents and the type of institutions is through the policies
adopted in each setting. The main argument here is that a non-democratic government adopts
distorted policies that are not necessarily beneﬁcial to the whole economy. I show how policies
are determined in both types of political structures. I map the eﬀect of these policies on economic
performance. In reality there are diﬀerent degrees of dictatorship and democracy. However, for
the purpose of this paper, I employ the two extreme cases of the spectrum of political institutions.
The model explains the absence of democratization in resource exporting economies using a two
class framework and a resource extraction model. Inequality is created from asymmetric property
rights over economic resources, speciﬁcally, non-renewable natural resources such as oil, metals
and ores. The income of the elite is generated from their factor endowment, capital, in addition to
income generated from resource extraction, whereas citizens can only derive income from labor in
a manufacturing sector. Extraction and production take place in two periods. Political transition
cannot be initiated through the increase of economic power of citizens because of asymmetric
property rights. It can, however, be initiated through a threat of revolution that can take place at
the beginning of the second period. In a democracy benchmark case, policies in the two sectors of
the economy are not constrained by a revolution threat. Transfer policies in both sectors reﬂect
the preferences of the median voter and there are no asymmetric property rights over resource
extraction.
The model suggests that the elite distort the incentive for revolution by imposing an extraction
plan that leaves very little for citizens to revolt for. This is done through subsidizing the resource
extraction and ﬁnancing the subsidy through taxation. An important ﬁnding of the model is that
ﬁrst period extraction in non-democracies is higher than in democracies. The return from over-
extracting in the ﬁrst period is higher because it is subsidized and because it averts the threat of the
revolution. Resources revenues are collected in the current period rather than the future period.
Resource booms, an exogenous increase in second period price, increase the subsidy and extraction
in the ﬁrst period. This suggests that price signals are weaker than the revolution constraint,
leading to more ineﬃcient extraction. In democracy, the resource extraction sector is actually
taxed rather than being subsidized as a means of transferring income from elite to citizens. These
diﬀerent policies stem mainly from the diﬀerent type of political institution, leading to resource
rents are being substantially higher in the non-democracy case than in the democracy one. The
other important ﬁnding of this model is that the elite sacriﬁce part of their income in order to
increase the cost of revolution expressed as portion of citizens wage. The investment decision is also
distorted by an investment subsidy which increases during resource booms. However, investment
in the non-resource sector falls short of investment in the democracy benchmark where the optimal
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investment subsidy is higher. This supports the notion of crowding out of investment. It only takes
place when there are excessive transfers from the manufacturing sector to the resource sector as
in the non-democracy case of this model. Additionally, the model shows that income in a non-
democracy stagnates during resource booms while income grows in democracy. The main reason
behind this divergence is that income in a non-democracy suﬀers from two drawbacks. It suﬀers
from ineﬃcient extraction that allocates almost all extraction to the ﬁrst period even though a
resource boom is expected in the second period. It also suﬀers from lower investment in the
manufacturing sector. In the case where future prices are not known with certainty, ineﬃcient
extraction is increased.
The most important contribution of this paper is that it explains why dictatorship is the
preferred choice of political institution for the ruling elite. This endogenous choice reﬂects the
costly nature of democracy for the elite in resource dependent economies. Elite income in a non-
democracy is higher even with the costly subsidies they adopt to divert the threat of revolution. If
a country is a non-democracy, it will remain so as long as its economy is resource dependent and
as long as property rights over extraction are asymmetric.
The paper proceeds as follows. The model and its main ﬁndings are presented in the next
section. Results of numerical simulations are in the third section. Next, two extensions of the
model are presented, the ﬁrst dealing with uncertainty in price of resources and the second deals
with price determination in the world market. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model is a two period model with two sectors: manufacturing sector and resource extraction
sector. There are two types of agents in the economy: ruling elite who are endowed with capital and
citizens who are endowed with labor. The population is normalized to 1 where citizens constitute
a fraction λ such that λ 1/2. Both capital and labor are employed in the manufacturing sector.
Ownership of the natural resource depends on the type of political institutions and governance. In a
non-democratic institutional setting, elite own property rights over the natural resource exclusively.
They determine the extraction schedule and capture resource rents. If, however, the economy is
democratic, natural resource rents are allocated between the two groups according to their relative
size. The economy is endowed with a resource stock S which can be extracted in two periods
such that x1 + x2 ≤ S. In the main model, p1and p2 are the exogenous prices of the natural
resource. The game starts in a non-democratic setting where the politician in power cares only
about elite's income either because he is part of the elite or because he relies on their support
to continue in power in the second period. At the beginning of the game, elite, represented by
their politician, choose between adopting democracy or remaining as a non-democracy. If they
choose the former, the game follows as a democracy where citizens rule and decide on transfers. If,
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however, they decide to retain power, they will face a threat of revolution from citizens that enables
them to capture their share of resource rents in the second period. The second decision elite take
is whether to allow for revolution to take place or not. Preventing revolution is costly and so are
its consequences. There are two policy instruments that the governing politician uses in the ﬁrst
period to prevent a revolution: an extraction subsidy and an investment subsidy. Both of which
are essential to distort citizens incentives to conduct a revolution. Extraction subsidy increases
the incentive for extraction in the ﬁrst period versus the second period whereas investment subsidy
increases the capital stock in the second period which increases wage income of citizens4. The total
cost of these subsidies is covered through collecting a symmetric per head tax. Elite generate their
income from proﬁts in the manufacturing sector and rents from resource extraction. Citizens, on
the other hand, can only generate income from wage in the manufacturing sector. If, however,
they conduct a successful revolution, their income will increase by their share of resource rents net
of what they have to sacriﬁce from their wage income as a cost of revolution . The ﬂow of events
in non-democracy is as follows:
• Relative price of the resource good is determined in the world market,
• Government (elite) sets the extraction and investment subsidies,
• Elite choose the extraction schedule in the ﬁrst period that will maximize the resource rents
and the investment level that will maximize capital proﬁts,
• First period extraction and production take place,
• At the beginning of the second period, citizens determine whether it is beneﬁcial to conduct
a revolution or not,
• Extraction and production take place,
• Income of elite and citizens depends on the occurrence of a revolution.
The ﬂow of events in an democracy is diﬀerent in that there is no threat of revolution from
citizens or elite. Citizens don't have an incentive to revolt since transfer policies would reﬂect their
preferences. Also, there is no threat from elite to conduct a coup to regain power since they would
have not chosen democracy if it was not optimal for them in the ﬁrst place. I adopt the backward
induction approach. The ﬁrst step is to solve for optimal extraction and investment in both sectors.
4The construction of the model allows for the revolution to take place at the beginning of the second period. It
is therefore unnecessary to include income transfers and subsidies in the second period. This would only complicate
the model without providing additional insight into the working of revolution prevention. It is also useful to abstract
from elite commitment to transfers in the second period.
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Then, optimal subsidies are determined depending on the type of political institution. At each
stage of the game, income of elite will be determined. This will be the primary basis for their
decisions.
2.1 Optimal Extraction and Investment
Extraction decision can be expressed as a extractive ﬁrm that maximizes resource rents. The
cost of extraction is quadratic in both periods, and the subsidy is a quantity subsidy in the ﬁrst
period.
R = Maxx1R1 +Maxx2βR2 = Maxx1,x2
[
(p1 + s1)x1 − c1x1 − x
2
1
2
+ β
(
p2x2 − c2x2 − x
2
2
2
)]
subject to the resource constraint:
S − x1 − x2 > 0
Expressing the above problem in Lagrangian form:
R∗(s1) = L = (p1 + s1 − c1)x1 − x
2
1
2
+ β
[
(p2 − c2)x2 − x
2
2
2
]
+ ψ(S − x1 − x2) (2.1)
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
p1 + s1 − c1 − x1 = ψ
β (p2 − c2 − x2) = ψ
S = x1 + x2
Solving for x∗1, x
∗
2, and ψ
∗:
x∗1 =
(p1 + s1 − c1)− β(p2 − c2 − S)
1 + β
(2.2)
x∗2 =
β(p2 − c2)− (p1 + s1 − c1 − S)
1 + β
(2.3)
ψ∗ =
β(p1 + s1 − c1 + p2 − c2 − S)
1 + β
(2.4)
From equation (2.1) and using the Envelope Theorem:
∂R∗(s1)
∂s1
=
∂L
∂s1
= x∗1(s1)
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Also, it is clear that
dx∗1
dp1
=
dx∗1
ds1
= 1
1+β
> 05.
The manufacturing sector employs the labor of citizens and the capital of elite. Using a Cobb-
Douglas production function Q = λαK1−αt and using the manufactured good as a numeraire, proﬁts
to owners of capital in each time period are:
pit = (1− α)λαK1−αt
Where K2 = K1 + I. The total manufacturing proﬁts from both time periods net of investment is:
pi = MaxI
[
(1− α)λαK1−α1 − (1− q)I + β
[
(1− α)λα(K1 + I)1−α + Φ(K1 + I)
]]
Where Φ(K2) is the scrap value of capital at the end of the second period and q is the investment
subsidy. Elite choose I that would maximize the above equation. The ﬁrst order condition is:
β
[
(1− α)2( λ
K1 + I
)α + Φ
′
(K1 + I)
]
= 1− q (2.5)
The discounted marginal proﬁts in the second period equals the marginal cost of investment net of
subsidy. Assuming Φ(K2) = φK2, such that 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, then Φ′(K1 + I) = φ. Solving for capital
stock in the second period and optimal investment:
K2 = λ
[
β(1− α)2
1− q − φβ
] 1
α
(2.6)
I∗(q) = λ
[
β(1− α)2
1− q − φβ
] 1
α
−K1 (2.7)
For investment to be positive, K1 < λ
[
β(1−α)2
1−φβ
] 1
α
in the absence of investment subsidy. It also
follows that ∂I
∗(q)
∂q
= λ
α
[
(β(1−α)2)
1
1+α
1−q−φβ
] 1+α
α
> 06. Optimal proﬁts from manufacturing sector are:
pi∗(q) = (1− α)λαK1−α1 − (1− q)I∗(q) + β
[
(1− α)λα(K1 + I∗(q))1−α + φ(K1 + I∗(q))
]
5x∗1 is non-negative when p1+s1− c1 > β(p2− c2−S). The extraction subsidy is however only used to overcome
the threat of revolution not to subsidize extraction due to low prices in the ﬁrst period. It is therefore important
to assume that, even without the subsidy s1, p1 − c1 > β(p2 − c2 − S). To ensure that depleting the stock in the
second period is optimal: p2 > c2 + S. Also, for ψ
∗ > 0, the following has to be hold: p1 + p2 + s1 > c1 + c2 + S .
6From equation (2.5): 1− q − φβ > 0
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By the Envelope Theorem: ∂pi
∗(q)
∂q
= I∗(q) > 0. Similarly, in the absence of a revolution, the wage
of income of citizens in each period is:
Wt = αλ
αK1−αt
If a revolution is optimal for citizens, their income in the second period would be: (1−θ)W2 +λR2
where R2 =
[
(p2 − c2)(S − x∗1)− (S−x
∗
1)
2
2
]
and θ is the exogenous cost of revolution. This could be
thought as the resources in terms of labor time needed to organize themselves and to overtake
elites7. It is assumed that conducting a revolution is collectively an optimal decision such that
there is no free rider problem and that it would be successful once it is conducted8. If citizens do
not conduct a revolution, there will no re-distribution of resource rents. An interesting variation of
this model would have the cost of the revolution as a dependent variable of a policy of repression
adopted by the government.
2.2 Optimal Policies in Non-Democracy
The optimal extraction subsidy s∗1 and investment subsidy q
∗ are determined by the politician
or the government that is in power. The objective is to ensure that citizens will not have the
incentive to conduct a revolution while maximizing income of elite; which can be expressed as:
Ye = R
∗(s1) + pi∗(q) +Ge − (1− λ)T (2.8)
where T is the per head tax imposed on elite and citizens such that T ≤ T ∗ where T ∗ is an
exogenous maximum head tax. Total tax revenue covers the extraction and investment subsidies
and a transfer to elite, Ge:
T = qI∗(q) + s1x∗1(s1) +Ge (2.9)
Substituting for Ge from equation (2.9) into (2.8), Ye is:
Ye = R
∗(s1) + pi∗(q) + λT − qI∗(q)− s1x∗1(s1) (2.10)
Citizens will not conduct a revolution if their wage income in the second period is greater than
7Formally wage in second period is W2 = α ((1− θ′)λ)αK1−αt where θ′ is the fraction of labor endowment that
is allocated to revolution activities. However, post revolution wage income is expressed as (1 − θ)W2 to simplify
mathematical presentation since λ is exogenous. Similarly elite proﬁts in the second period will be reduced by the
reduction in the labor force such that pi(θ) < pi(θ = 0).
8This is a common assumption in the literature on democratization (See Acemoglu and Robinson [2001, 2006]).
Another way of thinking of it is that θ is the necessary cost for a collective and successful action. I also abstract
from ideological preferences since the purpose is to weigh the economic beneﬁts and costs of political transition.
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their net income with the revolution:
W2 > (1− θ)W2 + λR2
The non-revolution constraint can, therefore, be expressed as:
θW2 > λR2 (2.11)
Revolution is not rational if its cost is greater than its beneﬁt. Both sides of the above inequality are
controlled by the elite decisions in the ﬁrst period. The cost of revolution is controlled through their
investment decision and its beneﬁt is controlled by their extraction plan. These costly transfers
are still beneﬁcial to the elite. It suﬃce to compare their income under dictatorship with transfers
to prevent a revolution (Equation (2.10)) with their income in the event of a successful revolution,
Ye(Rev):
Ye(Rev) = R1 + β(1− λ)R2 + pi(θ)
Resource rents are less due to the lack of extraction subsidy and due to sharing resource rents in
the second period with citizens. Also, capital proﬁts are less because of less labor working in the
manufacturing sector and due to the lack of investment subsidies. Additionally, the elite receive
a net transfer of λT − qI∗(q) − s1x∗1(s1). Obviously, it is optimal to use the taxing capacity such
that T = T ∗.
Proposition 1. It is optimal for elite to distort the revolution incentives rather than allowing it
to take place when λT ∗ − qI∗(q)− s1x∗1(s1) > 0. Transfers to elite are positive in non-democracy.
Proof. Ye > Ye(Rev) when λT
∗ − qI∗(q) − s1x∗1(s1) > 0. Under the same condition, Ge = T ∗ −
qI∗(q)− s1x∗1(s1) > 0
Formally, the government problem is to maximize Ye subject to (2.9) and (2.11) and is expressed
using the following Lagrangian:
L = R∗(s1) + pi∗(q) + λT ∗ − qI∗(q)− s1x∗1(s1) (2.12)
+µ
[
θαλα (K1 + I
∗(q)) α − λ
(
(p2 − c2) [S − x∗1(s1)]−
[S − x∗1(s1)]2
2
)]
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
q∗ = µ∗
[
θα(1− α)
(
λ
K1 + I∗(q)
)α]
(2.13)
s∗1 = µ
∗λ [p2 − c2 − S + x∗1(s1)] (2.14)
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θαλα (K1 + I
∗(q)) 1−α = λ
[
(p2 − c2) [S − x∗1(s1)]−
[S − x∗1(s1)]2
2
]
(2.15)
Optimal subsidies can be found by solving the above system of equations (See Appendix B.2).
Equation (2.15) entails that the non-revolution constraint binds and that the choice of variables
s∗1 and q
∗ will guarantee that a revolution does not take place.
2.3 Optimal Policies in Democracy
In contrast to non-democracy, the objective a democratic government is to maximize the income
of the median voter and is not constrained by a threat of revolution. In the case where λ  1/2
the median voter is a citizen. The other key diﬀerence is that resource rents are shared between
the elite and citizens according to their share in the population. Also, income transfer, Gc, is
given to citizens rather than the elite. Using sd1 and q
d as the optimal extraction and investment
subsidies in democracy respectively, the optimal extraction, resource rents, and optimal investment
are identical to the non-democracy case after substituting sd1 for s1 and q
d instead of q in equations
, (2.1), (2.2)and (2.7). Wage income of citizens from the manufacturing sector is:
W ∗(qd) = W1 + βW2 = αλαK1−α1 + βαλ
α
(
K1 + I
∗(qd)
)1−α
Income of the median voter can, therefore, be expressed as:
Y dc = λR
∗(sd1) +W
∗(qd) +Gc − λT
Using the same taxing capacity as in non-democracy, T ∗, such that T ≤ T ∗, the government budget
constraint is:
T = Gc + q
dI∗(qd) + sd1x
∗
1(s
d
1)
Using the full capacity to tax, the median vote income is:
Y dc = λR
∗(s1) +W ∗(q) + (1− λ)T ∗ − qI∗(q)− s1x∗1(s1) (2.16)
The ﬁrst order condition of equation (2.16) with respect to sd1 is:
λ
∂R∗(sd1)
sd1
− xd1(sd1)− sd1
∂x
d
1(s
d
1)
sd1
= 0
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Recalling that
∂R∗(sd1)
sd1
= xd1(s
d
1) and
∂xd1(s
d
1)
sd1
= 1
1+β
:
sd1 = −(1 + β)(1− λ)xd1(sd1)
Substituting for xd1(s
d
1), the optimal extraction subsidy is:
sd1 = −
(1− λ) [p1 − c1 − β(p2 − c2 − S)]
2− λ (2.17)
Substituting equation (2.17) back into xd1(s
d
1) gives the expression for optimal extraction in democ-
racy as a function of the model parameters:
xd1(s
d
1) =
(p1 − c1)− β(p2 − c2 − S)
(1 + β)(2− λ) (2.18)
Also, the ﬁrst order condition for investment subsidy is:
∂W ∗(qd)
∂qd
− I∗(qd)− qd∂I
∗(qd)
∂qd
= 0
Using I∗(qd) = λ
[
β(1−α)2
1−qd−φβ
] 1
α−K1, ∂W ∗(qd)∂qd = λ1−α
[
β(1−α)2
1−qd−φβ
] 1
α
and ∂I
∗(qd)
∂qd
= λ
α
[
(β(1−α)2)
1
1+α
1−qd−φβ
] 1+α
α
the
ﬁrst order condition is:
α
1− α
[
1
1− qd − φβ
] 1
α
+
K1
λ (β(1− α)2) 1α
− q
d
α
[
1
1− qd − φβ
] 1+α
α
= 0 (2.19)
Equation (2.19) is non-linear and can only be solved numerically.
2.4 Optimal Policies and Resource Booms
The following propositions regarding optimal policies can be deduced from the above analysis:
Proposition 2. Optimal subsidies for resource extraction and investment are positive in non-
democracy. Resource extraction is taxed in democracy when (p1 − c1) > β(p2 − c2 − S).
Proof. Since the non-revolution constraint binds (Equation (2.15)), µ∗ is positive. It follows from
equations (2.13) and (2.14) and the assumption of p2 > c2 +S that q
∗ > 0 and s∗1 > 0. The second
part of the proposition follows directly from equation (2.17).
It very important to point out that if it were not for the threat of revolution, elite would have
chosen zero subsidies in both sectors. In this case, there would be no need to sacriﬁce any part of
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their income to stay in power. On the other hand, resource extraction is taxed in democracy as long
as it is feasible to extract. Resource extraction in subsidized only when β(p2− c2−S) > (p1− c1),
the condition under which ﬁrst period extraction is non-positive. For the sake of comparison
between the two types of political institutions, the condition for feasible extraction is maintained.
Proposition 3. First period optimal extraction under non-democracy is higher than under democ-
racy.
Proof. From Proposition 2, Extraction is subsidized in non-democracy whereas it is taxed in democ-
racy (Equation (2.17)), for the same price and cost parameters, and stock of resource, it is clear
that x∗1 > x
d
1.
It follows from the above propositions that resources rents in non-democracy are higher than
in democracy due to the over extraction subsidy.
Proposition 4. Resource rents are higher in non-democracy than in democracy.
Proof. Since x∗1 > x
d
1 and since
∂R∗(s∗1)
s∗1
= x∗1(s
∗
1) > 0 and
∂R∗(sd1)
sd1
= xd1(s
d
1) > 0 , then R
∗(s∗1)>R
∗(sd1)
The comparison between the performance of manufacturing sectors in non-democracy and
democracy is not as evident as in the resource sector. Optimal investment and proﬁts will depend
on optimal investment subsidies. If qd > q∗, investment and capital proﬁts will be higher in
democracy than in non-democracy. Intuition suggests the magnitude of both subsidies depends
largely on the value of α. It is expected that qd and q∗ increase with α but for diﬀerent reasons. In
both cases, higher α leads to lower optimal investment. In the ﬁrst case, as α increases, citizens in
democracy have a preference for higher investment subsidy to increase their wage income and to
compensate for reduced optimal investment. On the other hand, elite in non-democracy will have
an incentive to increase q∗ to increase the low cost of revolution caused by low wage income.
Proposition 5. An increase in p2 increases extraction subsidy and extraction in the ﬁrst period
in non-democracy.
Proof. See Appendix (B.1)
Extraction is increased in the ﬁrst period in response to price booms in the second period. The
mechanism is simple: an increase in p2 causes an increase in extraction subsidy for two reasons.
First, extraction subsidy creates an incentive for extraction in the ﬁrst period and compensates
for forgone proﬁts in the second period. Second, the subsidy reduces the incentive for citizens
to revolt by reducing the resource revenue in the second period. These two eﬀects are generated
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solely by the non-revolution constraint. This result is quite diﬀerent from the result of Robinson
et. al. (2006) where they ﬁnd that resource booms reduce the ineﬃcient extraction. Also, this is a
sharp contrast to the democracy case where price booms would necessarily lead to a reduction in
the extraction tax to increase overall extraction and to reallocate extraction to the second period
to increase rents (from equation 2.18:
∂xd1
dp2
= −β
(1+β)(2−λ) < 0).
Proposition 6. An increase in p2 decreases optimal investment subsidy and optimal investment
if p1 + s1 − c1 − S > β(2 + β)(p2 − c2).
Proof. See Appendix (B.1).
The eﬀect of price booms on investment subsidy is not straightforward as its eﬀect on the
extraction subsidy. Again, there are two opposing eﬀects. Since an increase in p2 reduces the
stock of resources remained in the second period as suggested by Proposition 5, there is less of an
incentive for elite to subsidize investment in order to increase the cost of revolution. The opposing
eﬀect is that lower investment subsidy decreases investment and lead to a reduction of income of
elite through lower proﬁts. With the above condition, the latter eﬀect is stronger than the ﬁrst
eﬀect. Worth noting that investment subsidy and optimal investment in democracy do not depend
on resource prices as in the case of the non-democracy.
3 Numerical Simulation
The numerical simulation provides an additional insight on areas where the theoretical model
was ambiguous. Detailed results are robust to parameters values and are presented in Appendix
C. The ﬁrst result is that investment subsidy in democracy is greater than in non-democracy. The
intuition behind this result goes back to the purpose of the subsidy in each case. In non-democracy,
elite face two constraints in determining q∗, the taxing capacity constraint and the non-revolution
constraint. If they were constrained by the former only, optimal q∗would have been zero. However,
the second constraint forces the elite to choose a positive q∗. The investment subsidy is used as a
tool to increase the cost of revolution (the left hand side of equation (2.11)). On the other hand,
investment subsidy in democracy is a transfer from elite to citizens and is determined by citizens.
It is only constrained by the taxing capacity (Figure C.4). This results leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. When qd > q∗, optimal investment and manufacturing sector proﬁts are higher in
democracy than in non-democracy.
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Proof. Since ∂I
∗(q)
∂q
> 0 then I∗(qd) > I∗(q∗) when qd > q∗. Similarly since ∂pi
∗(q)
∂q
> 0, then
pi∗(qd) > pi∗(q∗) when qd > q∗
3.1 Choice of Political Institution
Elite choice to adopt democracy depends on the income they get under both types of political
institution. Recalling equation (2.10):
Ye = R
∗(s∗1) + pi
∗(q∗) + λT ∗ − q∗I∗(q∗)− s∗1x∗1(s1)
While income of elite under democracy is:
Y de = (1− λ)R∗(sd1) + pi∗(qd)− (1− λ)T ∗
Formally, elite will choose dictatorship and would not allow for political transition if:
Ye > Y
d
e
Alternatively, the above inequality can be expressed as:
T ∗ − q∗I∗(q∗)− s∗1x∗1(s1) >
[
(1− λ)R∗(sd1)−R∗(s∗1)
]
+
[
pi∗(qd)− pi∗(q∗)] (3.1)
Proposition 1 suggests that the left hand side of the equation (3.1) is positive. The ﬁrst part
of the right hand side is negative (Proposition 4) while the second part is positive (Proposition
7). However, the amount of resource rents that elite have to let go in democracy is substantially
higher than the amount of manufacturing proﬁts they gain in return. Therefore, the net transfer
in non-democracy is always higher than the net potential gain in democracy because the right
hand side of the above inequality is always negative (Figure C.5). Elite choose to retain power
and discard democracy as a choice of political institution.
3.2 Resource Booms
Extraction subsidy is substantial compared to the ﬁrst period price (Figure C.1). The most
intriguing result is the diﬀerence between the eﬀect of resource booms on extraction in democracies
and non-democracies (Figures C.2 and C.3). In the democracy case, optimal extraction in the
ﬁrst period is reduced in response to future increase in price. The exact opposite takes place
in non-democracy. Actually, the resource stock is nearly depleted in the ﬁrst period and over-
extraction increases as p2 increases. These results are in line with Propositions 3 and 5. Optimal
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investment subsidy does in fact increase with the increase of p2 (Figure C.4). This leads to
an increasing investment in non-resource sector during resource booms. However, as predicted
by Proposition 7, investment in democracy is greater than investment in non-democracy for all
values of p2/p1. Finally, income in democracies increases due to price booms whereas income in
non-democracies increases by a negligible amount compared to democracies (Figure C.6). This
reﬂects the eﬀect of both ineﬃciencies in resource sector: the subsidy ineﬃciency and ineﬃcient
intertemporal allocation. It also reﬂects the weak investment in manufacturing sector. Income in
democracy is less than income in non-democracy at low levels p2/p1of due to the eﬀect of extraction
taxation.
4 Model Extensions
The ﬁrst extension studies the eﬀect of resource price uncertainty, speciﬁcally second period
prices, on ﬁrst period extraction. The second extension, prices of resource good are determined
based on a game between a democratic and a non-democratic country.
4.1 Second Period Price Uncertainty
In order to determine the eﬀect of second period price on the extraction decisions, an assumption
about the risk aversion of the extractive ﬁrm is required. The utility over extraction rents, U(R),
is a concave function such that U ′ > 0 and U” < 0 . Price in the second period is uncertain such
that p2 = p˜2 +  and E(p2) = p˜2. An approach similar to that of Sandmo [1971] is adopted to
determine the impact of uncertainty in price on resource extraction. The resource extracting ﬁrm
maximizes its expected utility from extraction rents:
E [U(R)] = EU
[
(p1 + s1 − c1)x1 − x
2
1
2
+ β
(
(p2 − c2)(S − x1)− (S − x1)
2
2
)]
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to x1is: E
[
U ′(R). ∂R
∂x1
]
= 0 where: ∂R
∂x1
= p1+s1−βp2−C ′(x1)
and C ′(x1) = c1 − β(c2 + S) + (1 + β)x1. The above expression then becomes:
E
[
U ′(R).
∂R
∂x1
]
= E [U ′(R)(p1 + s1 − βp2 − C ′(x1))]
E [U ′(R) (p1 + s1 − C ′(x1))] = E [U ′(R)βp2]
subtracting E [U ′(R)βp˜2] from both sides of the equation:
E [U ′(R) (p1 + s1 − C ′(x1)− βp˜2)] = E
[
U ′(R)
(
β(p2 − p˜2)
)]
(4.1)
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The expected resource rents are:
E(R) = E
[
(p1 + s1 − c1)x1 − x
2
1
2
+ β
(
(p2 − c2)(S − x1)− (S − x1)
2
2
)]
E(R) = (p1 + s1 − c1)x1 − x
2
1
2
+ β
[
(p˜2 − c2)(S − x1)− (S − x1)
2
2
]
whereas:
R = (p1 + s1 − c1)x1 − x
2
1
2
+ β
[
(p2 − c2)(S − x1)− (S − x1)
2
2
]
which leads to:
R = E(R) + (p2 − p˜2)(S − x1)
R = E(R) + (S − x1)
If  > 0 then R > E(R) and U ′(R) < U ′ (E(R)) which leads to:
U ′(R)
(
β(p2 − p˜2)
)
< U ′ (E(R))
(
β(p2 − p˜2)
)
Taking expectations of both sides:
E
[
U ′(R)
(
β(p2 − p˜2)
)]
< E
[
U ′ (E(R))
(
β(p2 − p˜2)
)]
Since right hand side equals zero, it follows that E
[
U ′(R)
(
β(p2 − p˜2)
)]
< 0. Recalling equation
(4.1), this implies E [U ′(R) (p1 + s1 − C ′(x1)− βp˜2)] < 0. It is clear that:
p1 + s1 < C
′(x1) + βp˜2
Substituting for C ′(x):
x1 >
p1 + s1 − c1 − β ˜(p2 − c2 − S)
1 + β
(4.2)
Proposition 8. Resource extraction is greater in the case of price uncertainty than it is in the
case of price certainty.
Proof. Comparing equation (4.2) with the ﬁrst order conditions under certainty (equation 2.2),
the extractive ﬁrm over-extracts compared to the certainty case.
In the case of non-democracy, over-extraction in the ﬁrst period will go over and above what
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is optimal given the extraction subsidy. This is to guarantee that there is no beneﬁt for citizens
in their revolution decision when the realized value of p2is greater than its expected value.
4.2 Endogenous Resource Price
A simple Cournot game with one country as a non-democracy (country i) and another as a
democracy (country j) is used to investigate how prices in world market is aﬀected by extraction
subsidies in non-democracies9. An identical linear demand function is used such that extraction
in the ﬁrst period will determine the prices in the two periods:
p1 = a− b(xi1 + xj1)
p2 = a− b(xi2 + xj2)
Using Si = xi1 + x
i
2 and S
j = xj1 + x
j
2 , p2 is:
p2 = a+ b(x
i
1 + x
j
1)− b(Si + Sj)
Using identical cost of extraction in both countries, the resource extracting ﬁrm in the non-
democratic country maximizes resource rents:
Ri ≡Max [a− b(xi1 + xj1)]xi1 + s1xi1 − c1xi1 − (xi1)2
+β
[(
a+ b(xi1 + x
j
1)− b(Si + Sj)
)
(Si − xi1)− c2(Si − xi1)− (Si − xi1)2
]
whereas in country j:
Rj ≡Max [a− b(xi1 + xj1)]xj1 − c1xj1 − (xj1)2
+β
[(
a+ b(xi1 + x
j
1)− b(Si + Sj)
)
(Sj − xj1)− c2(Sj − xj1)− (Sj − xj1)2
]
Using the Envelope Theorem: ∂Ri
∂s1
= xi1 and
∂Rj
∂xi1
= βbSj − (1 + β)bxj1. The optimal extraction in
the ﬁrst period is:
xi1 =
a(1− β)− bxj1(1 + β) + s1 − c1 + β [(2b+ 1)Si + bSj + c2]
(2b+ 1)(1 + β)
xj1 =
a(1− β)− bxi1(1 + β)− c1 + β [(2b+ 1)Sj + bSi + c2]
(2b+ 1)(1 + β)
9This part of the paper abstracts from the extraction taxation in democracy as it does not add any new intuition
to the ﬁndings of this section.
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Substituting the expression of xj1into x
i
1:
xi1 =
a(1− β)− c1 + β [(2b+ 1)Si + bSj + c2]
(3b2 + 2b+ 1)
[
1 + b
(1 + β)
]
+
(2b+ 1)s1
(3b2 + 2b+ 1)(1 + β)
And substituting the expression of xi1into x
j
1:
xj1 =
a(1− β)− c1 + β [(2b+ 1)Sj + bSi + c2]
(3b2 + 2b+ 1)
(1 + b)
(1 + β)
− bs1
(3b2 + 2b+ 1)(1 + β)
In the special case where Si = SJ , xi1 > x
j
1 due to the eﬀect of the subsidy as in the main model
where ﬁrms were price takers (Proposition 3).
Proposition 9. Price in the ﬁrst period decreases with extraction subsidy while price in the second
period increases with subsidy.
Proof. Substituting the expression for xi1 and x
j
1 into the expressions for p1and p2:
∂p1
∂s1
=
−b(b+ 1)
(3b2 + 2b+ 1)(1 + β)
< 0
∂p2
∂s1
=
b(b+ 1)
(3b2 + 2b+ 1)(1 + β)
> 0
Proposition 10. Democratic countries gain from extraction subsidies in non-democratic countries.
Proof. If
∂Rj
∂xi1
> 0 then
∂Rj
∂s1
> 0.
∂Rj
∂xi1
> 0 when Sj >
(1+β)xj1
β
. Substituting the expression for xj1 in
gives:
Sj >
1
β
[
(1 + b) [a(1− β)− c1 + β(bSi + c2)]
[3b2 + (2b+ 1)(1− β)] −
bs1
[3b2 + (2b+ 1)(1− β)]
]
Under the above condition,
∂Rj
∂s1
> 0
The higher the extraction subsidy, the smaller the right hand side of the above inequality
making it easier for the democratic country gain. The gains comes from selling more at a higher
price in the second period. At the extreme case, where over-extraction in country i depletes its
stock in the ﬁrst period, country j will have monopoly power of the resource market. Alternatively,
if the stock in country i is inﬁnite, country j will not beneﬁt from the resource extraction subsidy.
Similarly, gains in democratic country are easily achieved when their stock of resource is inﬁnite.
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5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the recent literature on political transition by examining the special
and interesting case of resource dependent economies. The model presented in this paper shows
that political institutions determine whether resource dependence constitutes a blessing or a curse.
It shows that non-democracy, as an type of political institutions performs less than a democracy
during resource booms; even though they have identical endowments. This result adds to the
literature on the institutional nature of the resource curse. The main result of the model is that
over-extraction takes place because of distortions created by extraction subsidies which are needed
to sustain dictatorship. The numerical simulation suggests that resource stock is almost depleted in
the ﬁrst period. Resource booms are actually a curse for a non-democracy because over-extraction
is increased to dampen the potential of a successful revolution. This paper suggests a new channel
that causes ineﬃcient extraction and it also shows that investment is inferior in non-democracies.
The other novelty in this paper is that it employs the threat of revolution to study the lack of
political transition in resource exporting countries. It endogenizes the beneﬁt and cost of revolution
through the extraction plan and investment decision of elites respectively. Citizens do not conduct
a revolution and political transition does not take place because its costly and with little beneﬁt.
Finally, the paper's main contribution is a model with endogenous choice of political institution by
the ruling elite. The beneﬁt of retaining power through setting transfers in the economy and the
beneﬁt from holding exclusive property rights over resource extraction make choosing democracy
a very costly choice for ruling elite.
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A Resource Exporting Countries
Table 1: Resource Exporting Countries
Fuel Exporting Countries
Fuel
Exports*
Ores and Metals
Exporting Countries
Ores and
Metals
Exports*
Bahrain 60.9 Chile 19.4
Qatar 55.4 Bahrain 12.4
United Arab Emirates 50.4 Zambia 12.3
Nigeria 49.0 Peru 9.8
Kuwait 48.7 Zimbabwe 8.4
Oman 47.0 Armenia 8.3
Gabon 46.6 Kazakhstan 7.8
Libya 44.6 Georgia 7.7
Azerbaijan 40.8 Luxembourg 7.3
Algeria 39.2 Bulgaria 7.3
Kazakhstan 36.0 Iceland 6.9
Saudi Arabia 35.2 Guyana 6.1
Venezuela 30.6 South Africa 5.9
Seychelles 28.2 Bolivia 5.8
Norway 27.8 Jordan 5.8
Syria 23.7 Togo 4.3
Yemen 23.0 Gabon 3.4
Iran 21.0 Kyrgyz Republic 3.1
Belarus 18.3 Norway 3.1
Russia 17.5 Morocco 2.7
Ecuador 14.4 Russian Federation 2.7
Lithuania 13.6 Hong Kong 2.6
Egypt 12.3 Dominica 2.6
Sudan 12.1 Slovenia 2.5
Cameroon 11.9 Panama 2.5
* Exports expressed as % of GDP. Data from the World Bank World Development Indicators
(2004)??? [2004] .
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B Mathematical Appendix
B.1 Proof of Proposition 5 and 6
Recalling the ﬁrst order conditions of equation (2.12):
Lµ = αθ
[
β(1− α)2
1− q − φβ
] 1−α
α
−
[
(p2 − c2)(S − (p1 + s1 − c1)− β(p2 − c2 − S)
(1 + β)
)− 1
2
(S − (p1 + s1 − c1)− β(p2 − c2 − S)
(1 + β)
)2
]
= 0
Lq = −q + µαθ1− q − φβ
β(1− α) = 0
Ls1 = −s1 + µλ
[
p2 − c2 − S + (p1 + s1 − c1)− β(p2 − c2 − S)
(1 + β)
]
= 0
The corresponding second order conditions are:
∂Lµ
∂µ
∂Lµ
∂q
∂Lµ
∂s1
∂Lq
∂µ
∂Lq
∂q
∂Lq
∂s1
∂Ls1
∂µ
∂Ls1
∂q
∂Ls1
∂s1

 ∂µ∂q
∂s1
 =

−
(
(p1+s1−c1−S)+(p2−c2)
(1+β)2
)
∂p1 +
(
β(2+β)(p2−c2)−(p1+s1−c1−S)
(1+β)2
)
∂p2
0
− µλ
1+β
∂p1 −
(
µλ1+2β
1+β
)
∂p2

such that:
∂Lµ
∂µ
= 0;∂Lµ
∂q
= (1−α)θ[β(1−α)]
2(1−α)
α
(1−q−φβ) 1α
> 0;∂Lµ
∂s1
= (p1+s1−c1−S)+(p2−c2)
(1+β)2
> 0.
∂Lq
∂µ
= αθ 1−q−φβ
β(1−α) > 0;
∂Lq
∂q
= −(1 + µαθ
β(1−α)) < 0;
∂Lq
∂s1
= 0.
∂Ls1
∂µ
= λ
[
(p1+s1−c1−S)+(p2−c2)
1+β
]
> 0;
∂Ls1
∂q
= 0;
∂Ls1
∂s1
= µλ
1+β
− 1 < 0 if µλ < 1 + β.
It can be veriﬁed that the determinant of the Hessian matrix is positive for the second order
conditions to hold.
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∂s∗1
dp2
=
det

0 (1−α)θ[β(1−α)]
2(1−α)
α
(1−q−φβ) 1α
β(2+β)(p2−c2)−(p1+s1−c1−S)
(1+β)2
αθ 1−q−φβ
β(1−α) −(1 + µαθβ(1−α)) 0
λ
[
(p1+s1−c1−S)+(p2−c2)
1+β
]
0 −µλ1+2β
1+β

det

∂Lµ
∂µ
∂Lµ
∂q
∂Lµ
∂s1
∂Lq
∂µ
∂Lq
∂q
∂Lq
∂s1
∂Ls1
∂µ
∂Ls1
∂q
∂Ls1
∂s1

It can also be veriﬁed from the above equation that the numerator is also positive, therefore
∂s∗1
dp2
> 0. And since
dx∗1
ds1
= 1
1+β
>0, then
dx∗1
dp2
> 0.
To determine the eﬀect of price booms on investment subsidy and investment, the same ap-
proach is used:
∂q∗
dp2
=
det

0 β(2+β)(p2−c2)−(p1+s1−c1−S)
(1+β)2
(p1+s1−c1−S)+(p2−c2)
(1+β)2
αθ 1−q−φβ
β(1−α) 0 0
λ
[
(p1+s1−c1−S)+(p2−c2)
1+β
]
−µλ1+2β
1+β
µλ
1+β
− 1

det

∂Lµ
∂µ
∂Lµ
∂q
∂Lµ
∂s1
∂Lq
∂µ
∂Lq
∂q
∂Lq
∂s1
∂Ls1
∂µ
∂Ls1
∂q
∂Ls1
∂s1

(B.1)
The sign of the numerator positive when p1 + s1 − c1 − S > β(2 + β)(p2 − c2). Since ∂q∗dp2 > 0 and
since∂I(q∗)
∂q∗ > 0, then
∂I(q∗)
dp2
under the same condition.
B.2 Solving for Optimal Subsidies
Dividing (2.13)by (2.14):
q∗
s∗1
=
(1− α)αθ [K1 + I∗(q)]−α λα
λ [p2 − c2 − S + x∗1(s1)]
(B.2)
Recalling equations (2.2) and (2.6), then equation (B.2) becomes::
q∗
1− q∗ − φβ =
αθ(1 + β)s∗1
λβ(1− α) [(p2 − c2 − S) + (p1 + s∗1 − c1)]
(B.3)
Also, substituting (2.2) and (2.6) into (2.15) gives:
25
q∗ = 1− φβ − β(1− α)2
 αθ
(p2 − c2)(β(p2−c2)−(p1+s
∗
1−c1−S)
(1+β)
)− 1
2
(
β(p2−c2)−(p1+s∗1−c1−S)
(1+β)
)2
 α1−α (B.4)
Substituting B.4 into B.3:
(1− φβ)
[
(p2 − c2)(β(p2−c2)−(p1+s1−c1−S)(1+β) )− 12(β(p2−c2)−(p1+s1−c1−S)(1+β) )2
] α
1−α
β(1− α)2(αθ) α1−α (B.5)
− αθ(1 + β)s1
λβ(1− α) [(p2 − c2 − S) + (p1 + s1 − c1)] − 1 = 0
The above equation is used to solve for s∗1 numerically.
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C Results of Numerical Simulation
Equation (B.5) is solved using the Quasi-Newton method on a Matlab routine. Resource price
in the second period, p2, is varied to analyze the eﬀect of resource booms. The value of s
∗
1 is used
to calculate the other variables such as x∗1(s1),q
∗, I(q∗) and total income of elite and citizens. Also
equation (2.19) is solved using a the same routine. Unless otherwise indicated, the table below
indicates the values used for model parameters:
α β λ θ K S φ c1 c2 p1
0.5 0.99 0.75 0.25 0.5 5 0.8 2 2 10
Figure C.1: Extraction Subsidy and Price Booms
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Figure C.2: Optimal Extraction in Non-Democracy
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Figure C.3: Optimal Extraction in Democracy
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
xd/S
p2/p1
28
Figure C.4: Optimal Investment Subsidy and Investment in Non-Democracy
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The corresponding values for qd and I
d
K1
are:
α = 0.25, K1 = 20 α = 0.5, K1 = 0.5 α = 0.75, K1 = 0.1
qd 0.028 0.077 0.146
Id
K1
2.44 4.39 6.47
Optimal investment subsidy and investment in democracy do not vary with p2.
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Figure C.5: Elite Net Gain from Democracy
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Figure C.6: Income and Resource Booms
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